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Abstract—Physical-layer key agreement is used to generate a
shared key between devices on demand. Such schemes utilize the
characteristics of the wireless channel to generate the shared key
from the device-to-device channel. As all characteristics are time-
dependent and location-dependent, it is hard for eavesdroppers
to get the key. However, most researches in this area use passive
attack models whereas active attacks that aim at manipulating
the channel and key are also possible. PHY-UIR (PHYsical
layer key agreement with User Introduced Randomness) is a
solution similar to the Diffie-Hellman protocol against such a
kind of active attack. The users (devices) introduce their own
randomness to help to prevent active attacks. In this paper, we
analyze the possibility of launching a session hijacking attack
on PHY-UIR to allow an attacker to control the shared key
established. The session hijacking attack manipulates the key
agreement through a man-in-the-middle (MITM) interaction and
forces legitimate devices to run the PHY-UIR protocol with
the attacker. Our simulation and experiment results validate
our attack and show the high performance of our attack on
manipulating the generated key. We also propose PHY-UIR+
where devices simultaneously exchange information about the
established shared keys, which allows them to detect whether
they have agreed to different keys with a third party.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, key management.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Internet-of-Things (IoT) is rapidly growing and willcontinue to do so with the help of other emerging
technologies, like 5th-generation (5G) wireless systems. For
the IoT to really reach its envisaged goal of interconnecting
all “things” we must be able to ensure secure device-to-device
communication. To provide basic security services between
devices, these devices must share cryptographic keys. Without
effective key management within a system, other security
services related to confidentiality, integrity and authentication
cannot function correctly as these all rely on devices holding
suitable cryptographic keys. Key management is not easy,
and becomes increasingly difficult as systems scale, e.g. each
device needs to share a unique secret symmetric key with
every other device it might wish to communicate with. This
leads to the storing of a large number of keys to ensure
that two devices that do meet already have a shared key.
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Key management, especially key establishment (the process
whereby two devices end up with a shared key) is therefore
important yet challenging [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].
Physical layer key generation schemes [6], [7] are a kind
of key establishment method that generates the shared key
based on the physical properties of channel measurements
of two devices and some schemes have been proven to be
information-theoretic secure [8]. If considering current key
management standards, like ISO/IEC 11770, models herein
always have the assumption that the parties to the estab-
lishment already have a trusted relationship, i.e. a shared
key, and that they can then establish a new key. The low
complexity of generating physical-layer keys on demand and
the benefit that it needs no prior shared secrets make this
type of key establishment a promising alternative to classical
cryptographic methods of key establishment [9]. Studying
the vulnerabilities of physical layer key generation schemes
to construct more robust and secure schemes is one of the
important future research scopes[10], while the approach has
also been proposed in industrial applications [11].
While passive attacks on physical layer key generation
schemes attract much attention, only a few authors focus on
analyzing active attacks. There are two kinds of active attacks.
One is the jamming attack [7], [12], which aims at decreasing
the speed of key generation. The other is the key manipulation
attack [13], [14], which aims at manipulating parts of or the
whole generated key. To mitigate the second kind of active
attack, researchers mainly focus on authenticating transmitters
by leveraging the fingerprints of previous signals that have not
been attacked. There are two kinds of fingerprints: hardware
fingerprints [15], [16] and channel fingerprints [17], [18].
However, hardware fingerprints have been broken by estimat-
ing and reproducing attacks [19], while channel fingerprints
are vulnerable to an analog man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack
by contaminating the signals used to generate fingerprints [20].
PHY-UIR [14] is a solution mitigating key manipulation
attacks, working on similar principles to the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol. The question is whether this protocol is
also vulnerable to the MITM attack, which the Diffie-Hellman
protocol suffers from. In our previous paper [21], we proposed
the possibility of launching a kind of MITM attack called the
session hijacking attack, which utilizes a fast reactive jamming
technology to force legitimate devices generating the shared
key with signals from the attacker when these devices are
executing the PHY-UIR protocol. This paper adds theoretical
analysis on the factors that impact on the success rate of
the session hijacking attack and proposes a countermeasure
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Fig. 1: RSS quantization procedure in PHY-UIR
Fig. 2: Phase quantization procedure in PHY-UIR
against the session hijacking attack.
The main contributions of our paper are as follows:
• We analyze the feasibility of the session hijacking attack
in more detail and identify the main factors that impact
on the success rate of the attack.
• We investigate the impact of these factors by simulation,
and then conduct experiments with software-defined ra-
dios to validate the simulation result.
• An enhanced scheme PHY-UIR+ is proposed and tested
to mitigate the attack in question.
II. PHY-UIR KEY GENERATION METHOD
In this section, we depict the workflow of the PHY-UIR key
generation method. As with other generation schemes, both
users exchange orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing
(OFDM) signals and generate the key from received OFDM
signals, but PHY-UIR extracts the key from two aspects:
received signal strength (RSS) and phase.
PHY-UIR extracts two bits from each round of signal
exchange. We show the process in Figure 1. Unlike with
other key agreement schemes, devices in PHY-UIR transmit
different signals in each round and multiply what they receive
with what they transmit to generate the shared signals and
apply a multi-level quantization method proposed in [22].
PHY-UIR measures the phase of the subcarrier frequency of
the signal to determine the sign of the corresponding two bits.
We illustrate the process in Figure 2. Bob receives the signal
with a phase offset θa b. Then he compensates for this phase
offset by adjusting the phase offset of its signal. Adding an
additional pi phase change indicates a negative sign, otherwise,
the value has a positive sign. Alice can also know the sign from
the phase offset she calculates from what she receives.
III. ANALYSIS OF SESSION HIJACKING ATTACK
In this section, we depict our session hijacking attack in
detail. Our attacker hijacks the communication during the
channel probing period and establishes two different shared
keys with each of the two devices separately. Our attacker
can act as a legitimate participant to communicate with both
devices. The main element of the attack is to eliminate the
randomness introduced by the user and replace the randomness
of channel state information (CSI). To achieve this, the attacker
transmits powerful fake signals to overshadow legitimate sig-
nals. In this way, the randomness of the fake signals and
the CSI between the attacker and users are known to the
attacker and the attacker can generate shared keys with Alice
or Bob. The shared keys consist of two parts, which are
generated by RSS and phase quantization schemes. We analyze
how our attack affects these two schemes separately. Table I
summarizes the notations we use in this paper.
A. OFDM Model
First we discuss background information of OFDM. In a
discrete-time system, an OFDM symbol consists of many
sample points that can be expressed as
s(k) =
1√
N
N−1∑
n=0
S(n)ej2pink/N (1)
where s(k) is the value of the kth point of the OFDM symbol,
N is the number of subcarriers and S(n) is the data that has
been modulated onto the nth subcarrier in this symbol. Here
we assume that the original phase offset is 0.
Parts of an OFDM symbol that corresponds to the nth
subcarrier can be expressed as
s(k, n) =
1√
N
S(n)ej2pink/N (2)
After transmission, the OFDM symbol will experience var-
ious reflections, backscattering and refraction in the multipath
channel, which we represent by adopting the multipath model
in [23]. In each channel tap, the channel impulse response
(CIR) can be expressed as
h(l, t) = µ(τl, t)e
jφ(τl,t) (3)
where l represents the lth channel path. µl(t) and φl(t)
are the amplitude attenuation and phase offset caused by this
channel path at time t. The total CIR of this channel can be
written as
hwhole(τ, t) =
L−1∑
l=0
h(l, t)δ(τ − τl) (4)
where L is the total number of the channel taps, τl is the delay
time of the lth channel tap and δ is the Dirac delta function.
As in the model, the tap delays are assumed to be sample-
spaced, which means that τl = lT . T is the sampling period
of the receiving device.
According to [24], a channel in a rich scattering environ-
ment is divided into small time frames. Each time frame can
be treated as a wide sense stationary (WSS) random process
which means each time frame is uncorrelated with the other
one. Each attacking unit in our paper can be treated as a WSS
random process. As an example, we analyze our attack in one
attack unit. For coherence time Tco, the CIRs of the channels
are constant and the length of one attack unit is less than one
coherence time, for simplicity we omit t in equations 3 and 4.
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TABLE I: Symbols for equations used in this paper
Symbol Notation
Aa, Ab
Aatt
The coefficients of signals
from Alice, Bob and the attacker
s(k) The value of the kth point of an OFDM symbol
s(k, n)
The value of the kth point of an OFDM symbol
at the nth subcarrier
r(k, n)
The value of the kth point of the signal received
at the receiver corresponding to the nth carrier
sa(k, n)
(sb(k, n))
Signals transmitted by Alice (Bob)
satt a(k, n)
(satt b(k, n))
Signals transmitted by the attacker
to Alice (Bob)
satt att(k, n)
Signals transmitted by the attacker
to the attacker
ra(k, n)
(rb(k, n))
Signals received by Alice (Bob)
ratt a(k, n)
(ratt b(k, n))
Signals received by the attacker
from Alice (Bob)
ca(k, n)
(cb(k, n))
Final signals used to generate the shared key
by Alice (Bob)
ca att(k, n)
(cb att(k, n))
Final signals used to generate the shared key
by the attacker corresponding to
Alice (Bob)
K Sa(k, n)
Main parts of ca att(k, n) to
generate the shared key
w(k, n) White Gaussian Noise
hwhole(τ, t) The total CIR of a channel
h(l, t) CIR of the lth channel tap
ha b(la b)
CIR of the ltha b channel tap
in the channel between Alice and Bob
ha att(la att)
CIR of the ltha att channel tap
in the channel between Alice and the attacker
hb att(lb att)
CIR of the lthb att channel tap
in the channel between Bob and the attacker
hatt att
CIR of the channel between two antennas
on the attacker
τl The delay time of lth channel tap
ε The time offset between two devices
ΘR b(n)
(ΘR att(n))
Phase offset measured
by Bob (the attacker)
randb(n)
(randatt(n))
A random number generated by Bob (the attacker).
It has only two possible values, 0 and 1
kb a
(katt a)
Total offset measured by Alice from the received
signals coming from Bob (the attacker)
ka b
(katt b)
Total offset measured by Bob from the received
signals coming from Alice (the attacker)
ka att
(kb att)
Total offset measured by the attacker from
the received signals coming from Alice (Bob)
τla b
The delay time of lth channel tap
in the channel between Alice and Bob
τla att
The delay time of lth channel tap
in the channel between Alice and the attacker
τlb att
The delay time of lth channel tap
in the channel between Bob and the attacker
εb a
(εa b)
Time offset between Alice and Bob which
is measured by Alice (Bob)
εatt a
(εa att)
Time offset between Alice and the attacker which
is measured by Alice (the attacker)
εatt b
(εb att)
Time offset between Bob and the attacker which
is measured by Bob (the attacker)
τaheada
(τaheadb )
Differences of arrival times between the
attack signals and the signals from Alice (Bob).
R,S,H ,Z Equivalent frequency domain value of r,s,h,w
ηatt,ηb Amplitude attenuation
In this paper, we also assume that the transmitter and the
receiver both have a perfect sampling clock [23]. Also as in
a slow fading environment, h can be treated as constant for
one OFDM symbol. Then the signal received at the receiver
Fig. 3: Workflow of a session hijacking attack on the RSS
quantization scheme
corresponding to the nth carrier can be represented by the
following equation[23]:
r(k, n) =
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)s(k − τl − ε, n) + w(k, n) (5)
where ε is the time offset that is caused by the imperfect
synchronization. The synchronization is used to find the start
point of the signal to extract the data perfectly. Due to the
impact of the channel, the noise and the synchronization
protocol, there is always imperfect synchronization. w is White
Gaussian Noise (WGN).
B. Attack Model
There are three entities in our attack model: an attacker
and two legitimate devices, Alice and Bob. Devices generate
the shared key with the help of PHY-UIR. The attacker can
sniff legitimate signals and transmit attack signals during the
channel probing stage to hijack the communication. What
the attacker does not know are the amplitudes of the signals
before they are transmitted and the channel state between
two legitimate devices. The attacker has knowledge of the
procedures of PHY-UIR and some settings only used for
communication, such as carrier frequency and modulation
scheme. We adopt the same wireless network settings used
in [25] and during the period of coherence time, all channels
between the three entities have constant states.
We analyze the impact of our session hijacking attack on
these two schemes below.
C. Hijacking Attack on RSS Quantization Scheme
We illustrate the workflow of our attack on the RSS
quantization step in Figure 3. We choose one bidirectional
signal exchange as an example. In this attack, sa and sb are
normal signals with random amplitude. satt b and satt a are
the attack signals transmitted by the attacker with constant
amplitude to Bob and Alice separately. According to Figure
2, Bob will compensate the offset in sb. Also, the attacker
will copy this action to enable the attack that we will depict
later in this section. The RSS quantization scheme chooses a
certain subcarrier to generate the shared key. The signals at
this subcarrier can be expressed as
sa(k, n) = Aas(k, n) (6)
sb(k, n) = Ab
1√
N
S(n)ej(2pink/N−ΘR b(n)+randb∗pi) (7)
satt b(k, n) = Aatts(k, n) (8)
satt a(k, n) = Aatt
1√
N
S(n)ej(2pink/N−ΘR att(n)+randatt∗pi) (9)
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In equation 6 and 7, Aa and Ab are coefficients used by
Alice and Bob to change the amplitude of the signals. Aatt
is the coefficients used by the attacker. Each signal has a
constant coefficient but from the view of the whole channel
probing procedure, Aa and Ab vary randomly from one signal
to another to form the randomness introduced by the user while
Aatt is a constant value. ΘR b is the phase offset measured by
Bob. ΘR att is the phase offset measured by the attacker from
the signal transmitted by Alice. Bob and the attacker make
a decision on the sign of current signal by rand, 0 means
positive and 1 means negative. Then the received signals, ra
and rb, at the certain subcarrier are:
ra(k, n) =
La b−1∑
la b=0
ha b(la b)sb(kb a, n) (10)
+
La att−1∑
la att=0
ha att(la att)satt a(katt a, n) + wa(k, n)
where
kb a = k − τla b − εb a + τahead a
katt a = k − τla att − εatt a
and
rb(k, n) =
La b−1∑
la b=0
ha b(la b)sa(ka b, n) (11)
+
Lb att−1∑
lb att=0
hb att(lb att)satt b(katt b, n) + wb(k, n)
where
ka b = k − τla b − εa b + τahead b
katt b = k − τlb att − εatt b (12)
In the above two equations, La b, La att and Lb att are
the total number of the channel taps in channels Alice-Bob,
Alice-Attacker and Bob-Attacker respectively. The received
sa and sb also have the same time offset with their relayed
versions, because the receiver has synchronized with their
relay versions. τahead a and τahead b are the time differences
that the signals arrives at the receiver ahead of the attack
signals.
According to PHY-UIR, the final signals used to generate
parts of the shared key by the RSS quantization scheme at
legitimate devices are:
ca(k, n) =
La b−1∑
la b=0
ha b(la b)sa(k, n)sb(kb a, n) + sa(k, n)wa(k, n)
+
La att−1∑
la att=0
ha att(la att)sa(k, n)satt a(katt a, n) (13)
and
cb(k, n) =
La b−1∑
la b=0
ha b(la b)sb(k, n)sa(ka b, n) + sb(k, n)wb(k, n)
+
Lb att−1∑
lb att=0
hb att(lb att)sb(k, n)satt b(katt b, n) (14)
From the view of the attacker, received signals at correspond-
ing subcarrier during the signal transmission time of Alice and
Bob are ratt a and ratt b are:
ratt a(k, n) =
La att−1∑
la att=0
ha att(la att)sa(ka att, n)
+ hatt attsatt att(k, n) + wa att(k, n) (15)
where
ka att = k − τla att − εa att
and
ratt b(k, n) =
Lb att−1∑
lb att=0
hb att(lb att)sb(kb att, n)
+ hatt attsatt att(k, n) + wb att(k, n) (16)
where
kb att = k − τlb att − εb att
In the above two equations, ratt a and ratt b represent
the signal corresponding to the certain subcarrier received by
the attacker. These two equations are a little different than
equations 10 and 11. As the attack signals are transmitted
and received all by the attacker and the receiving antenna and
the transmitting antenna are very close at the attacker there is
almost no multipath effect. We use hatt att to represent the
CIR of the channel between the receiving antenna and the
transmitting antenna of the attacker.
As self-interference cancellation technology can be used to
eliminate the interference caused by hatt attsatt att, we adopt
the technology in [26], which can reduce the self-interference
to the noise floor. This means hatt attsatt att in equations 15
and 16 can be merged into wa att and wb att.
The final signals ca att and cb att that are used for RSS
quantization with devices Alice and Bob are:
ca att(k, n) =
La att−1∑
la att=0
ha att(la att)sa(ka att, n)satt a(k, n)
+ wa att(k, n)satt a(k, n) (17)
and
cb att(k, n) =
Lb att−1∑
lb att=0
hb att(lb att)sb(kb att, n)satt b(k, n)
+ wb att(k, n)satt b(k, n) (18)
Now legitimate devices and the attack device all get the
signals used for key generation through the RSS quantization
scheme. This scheme is performed at a certain subcarrier. Parts
of ca and ca att that belongs to the certain subcarrier are
used to generate the key between Alice and the attacker while
corresponding parts of cb and cb att are used to generate the
key between Bob and the attacker. As Alice and Bob generate
the key with the attacker in the same way, we analyze Alice
and the attacker only. As the noise can be neglected, the key
generated by the attacker to communicate with Alice comes
from the rest of ca att which we call it key source K Sa.
K Sa(k, n) =
La att−1∑
la att=0
ha att(la att)sa(ka att, n)satt a(k, n)
=
La att−1∑
la att=0
ha att(la att)Aa
1√
N
S(n)ej2pinka att/N
· (Aatt 1√
N
S(n)ej(2pink/N−ΘR att+randb∗pi))
=
La att−1∑
la att=0
ha att(la att)sa(k,n)satt a(katt a+kd,n)
(19)
where
kd = εatt a − εa att
Alice generates her key based on the power of the signal
in equation 13 and the attacker generates corresponding key
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Fig. 4: Workflow of session hijacking attack on phase
quantization
based on the power of the signal in equation 19. Let’s compare
these two equations. We can see that if kd is equal to
zero, K Sa is equal to parts of ca. In equation 13, except
the parts which is equal to K Sa and the neglible noise,
only
∑La b−1
la b=0
ha b(la b)sa(k, n)sb(kb a, n) remains, which
has negative impact on our attack as it may change the
generated key. Comparing this remaining part in equation
13 with equation 19, we can see that if the power of the
signal
∑La att−1
la att=0
ha att(la att)satt a(katt a+kd,n) has more
power than
∑La b−1
la b=0
ha b(la b)sb(kb a, n), the generated key
at Alice should be more similar to the key generated at the
attacker.
∑La att−1
la att=0
ha att(la att)satt a(katt a + kd,n) is the
signal received by Alice which is transmitted by the attacker.∑La b−1
la b=0
ha b(la b)sb(kb a, n) is the signal received by Alice
which is transmitted by the Bob. So there are three factors that
have an impact on the phase of the received signals: εatt a(
εatt b), εa att(εb att) and the power ratio of the attack signal
to the legitimate signal at nth subcarrier at Alice (Bob).
D. Session Hijacking Attack on Phase Quantization Scheme:
After RSS quantization, we depict how the session attack
affects the phase quantization. The workflow is shown in
Figure 4. At first, Alice transmits a normal signal with no
phase offset (ΘT a(f) = 0). When the signal arrives at the
attacker, it can be written as:
Ratt a(n) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
ratt a(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
= Sa(n)Ha att(n)e
−j2pikεa att/N + Za att(n) (20)
where
Sa(n) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
sa(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
Za att(n) =
N−1∑
k=0
wa att(k)e
−j2pink/N (21)
Ha att(n) =
La att−1∑
la att=0
ha att(la att)e
−j2pinla att/N
The attacker transforms Ratt a(n) into a signal sR att
depending on equation 22. Then it extracts the phase offset
ΘR att from sR att as the attacker knows s. Ratt a(n) can be
written as equation 23. ηatt is the amplitude attenuation.
SRatt a(k, n) =
1√
N
Ratt a(n)e
j2pikn/N (22)
Ratt a(n) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
ηatts(k, n)e
(ΘR att−j2pikn/N)
= ηattS(n)e
jΘR att (23)
where
S(n) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
s(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
The signal received by Bob is written as:
Rb(n) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
rb(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
= Sa(n)Ha b(n)e
−j2pik(εa b−τahead b)/N
+ Satt b(n)Hb att(n)e
−j2pikεatt b/N + Zb(n) (24)
where
Satt b(n) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
satt b(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
Ha b(n) =
La b−1∑
la b=0
ha b(la b)e
−j2pinla b/N
Hb att(n) =
Lb att−1∑
lb att=0
hb att(lb att)e
−j2pinlb att/N
Zb(n) =
N−1∑
k=0
wb(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
After Bob has received the signals, he calculates the phase
offset ΘR b(n) of the nth subcarrier from Rb(n) by equations
25 and 26. ηb is the amplitude attenuation.
sRb(k, n) =
1√
N
Rb(n)e
j2pikn/N (25)
Rb(n) = ηbS(n)e
jΘb (26)
As we depict above, Bob will compensate the calculated
phase offset in the signal he transmits. This signal is written
as equation 27 when it arrives at the attacker.
Ratt b(n) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
ratt b(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
= Sb(n)Hb att(n)e
−j2pikεb att/N + Zb att(n) (27)
where
Sb(n) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
sb(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
Zb att(n) =
N−1∑
k=0
wb att(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
We can observe from this equation that the phase offset
ΘR att′ consists of two kinds of phase offsets caused by the
channel impulse, Hb att(n) and the time offset, e−j2pikεb att/N .
Next, the attacker transmits the attack signal to Alice. The
signal received by Alice is written as:
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 6
Ra(n) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
ra(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
= Sb(n)Hb a(n)e
−j2pik(εa b−τahead a)/N
+ Satt a(n)Ha att(n)e
−j2pikεatt a/N + Zb(n) (28)
where
Satt a(n) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
satt a(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
Hb a = Ha b
Za(n) =
N−1∑
k=0
wa(k, n)e
−j2pink/N
Because of channel reciprocity, Hb a is equal to Ha b.
Equation 28 tells us that there are five factors that have an
impact on the phase offset ΘR a measured by the attacker from
the signal transmitted by Bob: the channel impulses Ha b and
Ha att, the time offsets εa b and εatt a and the time difference
between the legitimate signal and the attack signal, τahead a.
Now, it is time to extract bits from the phase offset. Also,
we take a look at Alice and the attacker. Alice extracts bits of
the shared key determined by randatt, which is determined
by the attacker from equation 28. If the power of the attack
signal is much higher than the legitimate signal, εatt a is equal
to εa att and we ignore the negligible noise. By incorporating
equations 6, 9,20 and 23 into 28, Ra(n) can be expressed as
equation 29, which shows that Alice can extract the correct
phase offset from
Aatt
Aa
ejrandatt∗piηattS(n).
Ra(n) = Satt a(n)Ha att(n)e
−j2pikεatt a/N
=
Aatt
Aa
ej(−ΘR att(n)+randatt∗pi)
· Sa(n)Ha att(n)e−j2pik(εatt a−εa att)/N
=
Aatt
Aa
ejrandatt∗piηattS(n) (29)
The attacker extracts bits of the shared key determined by
Bob from equation 27. If the power of the attack signal is much
higher than the legitimate signal and εatt b is equals εb att, by
incorporating equations 7, 8,24 and 26 into 27, Ratt b(n) can
be changed into equation 30.
Ratt b(n) = Sb(n)Hb att(n)e
−j2pikεb att/N
=
Ab
Aatt
ej(−ΘR b(n)+randatt∗pi)
· Satt b(n)Hb att(n)e−j2pik(εb att−εatt b)/N
=
Ab
Aatt
ejrandatt∗piηbS(n) (30)
According to the above analysis, we find that there are also
three factors that have an impact on the phase of the received
signals: εatt a( εatt b), εa att(εb att) and the power ratio of
the attack signal to the legitimate signal at the nth subcarrier
at Alice (Bob).
IV. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
In section III-C and III-D, we analyze the factors that have
an impact on the generation of the shared keys. In this section,
we utilize Matlab to measure the impact of these factors on
the final keys.
A. Set-up
Matlab is used to simulate the attack. All devices adopt
the IEEE 802.11 OFDM protocol to communicate. Also, a
multipath fading channel simulation scheme [27] is chosen
to simulate the statistical wireless channel. The sampling rate
is 20 MHz. The Doppler spread is 5 Hz and the root mean
square delay spread is 150 ns. The power of the legitimate
signals varies from 50% to 150% compared to the standard
signal we choose to provide the user introduced randomness.
The power of the attack signal is set to be 5, 10 and 20 dB
higher than the standard signal. In 802.11a, there is a period
called the guard interval that lasts 16 sample points to avoid
Inter-Symbol Interference. So we specify that the time offset
ε in our simulation is no larger than 16 sample points, or 0.8
ns. In our simulation, we test the key similarity rate under
all possible time offset values for three kinds of power ratio.
As the key is generated from both RSS quantization process
and phase quantization process, we test these two processes
separately.
B. RSS Quantization
As discussed in section III-C, the key generated by Alice
(Bob) and the attacker from RSS quantization process is
affected by three factors: εatt a(εatt b), εa att(εb att) and the
power ratio of the received attack signals to the received
legitimate signals at the nth subcarrier at Alice (Bob). We use
PowRatt leg to represent this power ratio. We illustrate the
result of how these three factors affect the shared key in Figure
5. The unit of εatt a and εa att is one sample point. From this
figure we can observe that the key similarity between Alice
and the attacker is mainly affected by PowRatt leg. When
PowRatt leg is higher, the similarity of the shared key is
higher.
C. Phase Quantization
Section III-D shows the three factors that have impact on the
result of phase quantization: εatt a(εatt b), εa att(εb att) and
PowRatt leg . We only simulate the impact of εatt a, εa att
and PowRatt leg for simplicity. We illustrate the result of how
these three factors affect the shared key in Figure 6. The unit
of εatt a and εa att is one sample point. This table shows
that the difference between εatt a and εa att is the key factor
that affect the similarity between the key generated by phase
quantization. With the increasing of the difference between
εatt a and εa att, the key similarity varying periodically.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of our session hijacking attack,
we utilize software defined radios (USRP B200), to transmit
and receive signals to acquire real CSI information as in Figure
7. The two devices are about 7 m away from each other and
there are furniture and people between them. The attacker is
located at one of eight different places, from A1 to A8. The
power of the signals transmitted by Alice and Bob vary from
50% to 150% compared to a standard signal. The power of
the attack signal at the attacker is set to be 5, 10, 20 dB
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(a) PowRatt leg=5dB (b) PowRatt leg=10dB (c) PowRatt leg=20dB
Fig. 5: Key similarity of RSS quantization between Alice and the attacker
(a) PowRatt leg=5dB (b) PowRatt leg=10dB (c) PowRatt leg=20dB
Fig. 6: Key similarity of phase quantization between Alice and the attacker
higher than the power of the standard signals in three tests.
As in [14], the carrier frequency of the RF signal is 2.4
GHz and the sampling rate is 200 kHz. We implement the
channel probing parts of PHY-UIR in both legitimate devices,
as the main target of our attack is on this part. We also
implement a timing synchronization scheme [28]. As we do
not block the communication, a real-time reactive jamming
technology is indispensable. In our experiment, Alice and Bob
transmit signals at regular intervals. Our attacker records the
arrival time of the first signals of Alice and Bob to estimate
appropriate attacking time.
The result is shown in Figure 8. The Y-axis represents the
similarity between the shared keys extracted at the quantization
step. PowerRatio is the power ratio of the attack signal to the
legitimate signal. The X-axis indicates the proximity to the
legitimate device. The proximity increases from left to the
right on the X-axis. We can observe that when the attacker
transmits the attack signal with identical power at all eight
places, the similarity of the generated keys decreases as the
proximity between the attacker and legitimate device increases.
This is because longer distance brings higher attenuation,
which leads to lower power signals. So the similarity of the
generated shared keys mainly depends on the power of the
attack signal, but we also observe a sharp decline when the
power ratio is 5 dB. The reason is the rapid decreasing of the
timing offset when the power ratio increasing from 5 dB to
10 dB[28], which leads to more stable high similarity of the
key generated by phase quantization.
When the power of the attack signal is 5 dB higher than
the standard signal, and if the attacker is located further away
from Alice or Bob, the key similarity rate would be too low
to achieve key agreement, due to the low power of the attack
signal at the receiver. However, when the power ratio increases
to 10 or 20 dB, our attack succeeds at all eight positions.
VI. ENHANCED PHY-UIR
We have shown that our session hijacking attack can break
PHY-UIR. We introduce a third kind of randomness to enhance
PHY-UIR against the attack. We call this enhanced scheme
PHY-UIR+ and describe it further in this section.
A. Workflow of PHY-UIR+
PHY-UIR+ prevents our attack by adding an extra step
to PHY-UIR where information is simultaneously exchanged
between the honest parties to ensure that the keys they agreed
on are the same. In this step, PHY-UIR+ specifies that honest
parties should adopt binary frequency-shift keying (BFSK)
technology to modulate the data. A BFSK modulation scheme
is shown as
s(x) =
{
cos(2pif0t) x=’0’
cos(2pif1t) x=’1’
This scheme uses cosine waves with different frequency to
represent different bits.
We show the workflow of PHY-UIR+ in Figure 9. As an
example, we adopt the SHA-256 hash function.
Step 1: Alice and Bob execute PHY-UIR to generate the key:
Ka and Kb.
Step 2: Alice and Bob generate signals Sa and Sb separately.
Sa(Sb) contains message H(Ka)(H(Kb)), the hash
value of key Ka(Kb). Then they exchange the signals
simultaneously.
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Fig. 7: Topology
(a) Key similarity rate between Alice
and the attacker
(b) Key similarity rate between Bob
and the attacker
Fig. 8: Similarity of the shared key
Step 3: The devices perform a noise cancellation scheme to
remove the self-interference of the signal they receive.
It means that the rest of the received signals at Alice
and Bob are Sb and Sa respectively. Both devices
recover the messages and compare the message with
the hash value of their keys to check the existence of
the attacker.
We can see that if Ka and Kb are the same, the results at
Alice and Bob both are consistent. Inconsistency represents
the existence of the attacker. Devices should transmit powerful
noise to alert the other device.
If there exists an attacker, basically Ka and Kb are different
from each other, then H(Ka) is not equal to H(Kb). The
average amount of effort needed by the attacker to create two
different keys amounts to a collision resistance of SHA-256,
which is on average 2N/2 = 2128 hash attempts, which is
considered infeasible to calculate. Given that a hash also ex-
hibits a one-way property, an attacker cannot obtain additional
information from the key based on the hash transmitted.
Fig. 9: Workflow of PHY-UIR+
B. Performance Experiment
1) Attack Detection Performance: We conduct the experi-
ment with the same setting in section V and Figure 7. As Alice
and Bob detect the attacker by comparing the hash values
of their keys, we measure the similarity between these hash
values to reflect the effectiveness of PHY-UIR+. The result is
illustrated in Figure 10. The Y-axis refers to the similarity rate
measured at Alice and Bob. We can observe from this figure
that the similarity rates always locate in the range of 45% to
57% at both Alice and Bob. This means Alice and Bob can
detect the attacker effectively.
2) Energy Consumption Performance: To give an indication
of energy consumption of PHY-UIR+ relative to PHY-UIR,
Fig. 10: Similarity rate between H(Ka) and H(Kb)
at Alice and Bob
we implement the basic framework of PHY-UIR+ and PHY-
UIR in Sony Xperia e3 mobile phones. This system acts as a
protocol emulator where we do the cryptographic functions
and data transmissions as required, although not all signal
processing functions are fully implemented, e.g. the phone
cannot determine CSI. This provides a good estimation of IoT
devices as Qualcomm Snapdragon processors are promoted for
embedded and IoT devices, and the mobile device also allows
us to measure the cost of wireless transmission (802.11), which
is the main cause of power consumption. We keep running
these two schemes on the phones and record the remaining
power of the phones. The result is shown in Figure 11. This
figure shows that PHY-UIR+ uses only a little more energy
than PHY-UIR which means PHY-UIR+ offers improved
security while being similar in term of energy efficiency.
PHY-UIR
PHY-UIR+
Fig. 11: Energy consumption of PHY-UIR and PHY-UIR+
C. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of PHY-UIR+
against the session hijacking attack. We consider three po-
tential strategies the attacker will adopt.
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1) Security Model: For the purpose of analyzing, we con-
sider the following security model.
Definition 1 (Security Objectives): The proposed scheme
has the following security requirements:
1) The scheme should detect a session hijacking attack.
2) The scheme should have no requirement of pre-shared
secret information.
One of the main advantages of PHY-UIR is that it requires
no pre-shared secret information to generate shared key. The
solution should inherit this advantage.
Definition 2 (Adversary): The adversary is an attacker
who can capture legitimate signals and send its own attack
signals to overshadow target signals. The adversary has full
knowledge of the design of PHY-UIR and PHY-UIR+, but
without unlimited computing resources.
As the protocol generates keys for each communication ses-
sion, the adversary needs to launch session hijacking attacks in
each communication session. Thus, security analysis considers
only one protocol execution.
1) Brute-Force Search Attack: To investigate the ability of
PHY-UIR+ to resist brute-force search, we present Lemma 1
below.
Lemma 1: If there is no session hijacking attacker, the pos-
sibility that the eavesdropper guesses the shared key correctly
at the final key exchanging step is no higher than (
1
2
)Nkey .
Nkey is the length of the shared key.
Proof : According to [24], if the channel in a rich scattering
environment is divided into small time frames, each time
frame can be treated as a wide sense stationary (WSS) random
process which means each time frame is uncorrelated with the
other one. We also treat the OFDM signals in our paper as a
WSS random process.
Each signal can extract three bits, two bits by RSS and one
bit by phase. There are eight possible values and we set the
possibility of these eight values as Pr1 to Pr8:
Pr1 + Pr2 + Pr3 + Pr4 + Pr5 + Pr6 + Pr7 + Pr8 = 1 (31)
The attacker guess the value with equal possibility to choose
one of the eight values. The possibility that the attacker recover
the correct bits is:
1
8
(Pr1 +Pr2 +Pr3 +Pr4 +Pr5 +Pr6 +Pr7 +Pr8) =
1
8
(32)
Because the bits generated from each signal are uncorrelated
with the others, the success possibility of the attacker is:
(
1
8
)
Nkey
3 = (
1
2
)Nkey (33)
2) Signal Separation Attack: This attack tries to separate Sa
and Sb from the mixed signal and then recover H(Ka) and
H(Kb) with the purpose of recovering Ka and Kb. As a hash
function is a one-way function, it is hard to deduce the key
from its hash value.
3) Smart Session Hijacking Attack: Let’s consider a smart
session hijacking attack where the attacker tries to overshadow
the extra step that PHY-UIR+ adds after it launches the session
attack. We illustrate this attack in Figure 12.
The attacker transmits signal with malicious data Att, which
has the same length with H(Ka) and H(Kb). Now we are
going to prove the effectiveness of our method against the
smart session hijacking attack.
Fig. 12: Smart session hijacking attack
Lemma 2: When the attacker and Alice(Bob) transmit the
same bit at the extra step in PHY-UIR+, Bob(Alice) receives
the same bit.
Proof:When Alice and the attacker transmit the same bit,
the signal Bob receives is expressed as equation 34. As they
sent the same bit, both signals have identical frequency f , but
they have different amplitude and phase shift.
Rb = Satt + Sa
= αattcos(2pift+ θatt) + αacos(2pift+ θa) (34)
where αatt and αa are the amplitude of signals from the
attacker and Alice; θatt and θa are the phase offset of signals
from the attacker and Alice.
Equation 34 can change into equation 35 [29].
Rb = αcos(2pift+ θ) (35)
where
α =
√
α2att + α
2
a + 2αattαacos∆θ
∆θ = θatt − θa
tanθ =
αattsinθatt + αasinθa
αattcosθatt + αacosθa
We can observe from equation 35 that Rb has the same
frequency as Satt and Sa, which means Bob receives the same
bit that is transmitted by Alice and the attacker. Similarly we
can prove that when Bob and the attacker transmit the same
bit, Alice receives the same bit.
Lemma 3: When a smart session hijacking attack has been
launched successfully and there are difference between hash
values, H(Ka) and H(Kb), generated by two legitimate
participants, PHY-UIR+ can always detect the attack.
Proof: First, we specify the operation that legitimate partic-
ipants use to recover data from received signal as
⊗
. When
the attacker and Alice(Bob) transmit different bits, the final bit
recovered by Bob(Alice) can be either of those two different
bits, usually the one with higher energy. Adding Lemma 2,
we can write
⊗
as
A
⊗
B =
{
A A=B
Aor B A 6= B
As we set a precondition that H(Ka) and H(Kb) have
differences, we only consider the differences. Analyzing at bit
level, one bit transmitted by Alice is b and the corresponding
bit transmitted by Bob is ¬b. This is because BFSK transmits
binary bits. The result at Alice is Att
⊗¬b while the result
at Bob is Att
⊗
b. According to the workflow in Figure 9,
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the adversary needs to satisfy the following two equations to
avoid being detected:
Att
⊗
¬b = b (36)
Att
⊗
b = ¬b (37)
If the adversary wants to satisfy equation 36, Att should be
equal to b which will make equation 37 false, vice versa. This
means either Alice or Bob will detect the attack. So Lemma
3 is proved.
VII. RELATED WORK
The signal manipulation attack is a well-known attack
in wireless networks. There are three kinds of signal ma-
nipulation attacks [30]: the disruptive jamming attack, the
manipulative jamming attack and the channel manipulation
attack. The disruptive jamming attack is the blocking attack
we discussed in the introduction. The manipulative jamming
attack injects a signal to manipulate the generated key while
the channel manipulation attack controls the channel to infer
the key.
There are five practical key manipulation attacks: three for
manipulative jamming [14], [13], [31] and two for the channel
manipulation [32], [33] by now.
In [14], an attack which aims at forcing both victims
(devices) to generate the same shared key that is known to
the attacker by injecting signals, is proposed. But it needs to
have knowledge of the CSI of the channels between victims to
the attacker. Another similar method [13] also wants to control
the key but it requires waiting for an opportunity to inject the
attack signals, which leads to a low key manipulation rate. The
idea of [31] is relaying legitimate signals with higher power
to overshadow the legitimate signal. Hence, there exists non-
trivial probability that the receiver will extract they key from
the information of the channel between the attacker and the
receiver.
Instead of injecting signals to manipulate the key, [32]
proposed a novel method to control the channel by controlling
the movements of the intermediate objects or the devices
themselves. Then the CSI of the channel will change in a
predictable way, which can be used to infer the shared key
extracted from the controlled CSI. However, introducing an
additional random variable that is unknown to the attacker
[33] can stop this attack.
Our proposed attack has fewer constraints compared to [14],
[13], [33]. Our attack has no need for prior knowledge of
the CSI of the channels or wait for a specific moment to
attack. Another advantage of our attack is that it can break the
proposed security schemes that protects against the attacks in
[14], [32], [33].
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced a novel active attack, called a
session hijacking attack, against an existing physical layer-key
generation scheme with user introduced randomness (PHY-
UIR). Instead of attempting to reveal the key generated by
legitimate participants, our attack forces participants to run
the key generation scheme with the attacker by injecting attack
signals.
We analyze the impact of the session hijacking attack on
two quantization schemes, RSS and signal phase, used in PHY-
UIR. Then we study the effectiveness of our attack on these
two schemes by simulation. Results show that the power ratio
between the attack signal and the legitimate signal at Alice
(Bob) is the crucial factor to success or failure of the RSS
quantization attack, while for the signal phase quantization
attack the key factor is the time offset. Experiments were also
conducted to validate the effectiveness of our attack and the
findings of the simulation.
In the end, we propose PHY-UIR+ to detect our session
hijacking attack by adding an extra step for both devices
exchanging information about the shared keys at the same
time. Experiments have shown that PHY-UIR+ can detect the
proposed session hijacking attack effectively and efficiently.
Finally, we analyze the security of this method and prove
the resistance to brute-force attacks and enhanced session
hijacking attacks.
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